

school, that their discussions of the origin of religion, if not indeed altogether wide of the mark, are at all events oblivious of the problems that really count. What we chiefly want to know is why religion is born in A, B, and C, our contemporaries and friends, not simply why it came into existence long ago. Certain writers, ignoring this, fasten the religious consciousness to experiences distinctive of the earliest periods of human culture—dreams, visions, the sight of sleep or death. It is assumed that once religion began, it could not help persisting for a while, till the initial animistic impulse had spent itself. Manifestly this gives us little or no help in discovering why men are religious now.

H. R. MACINTOSH.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 1913-14. Pp. 438.

This number of the Aristotelian Society's *Proceedings* is considerably larger than usual owing to the presence of a 'discussion' between Drs. Schiller and Wolf on the "Value of Logic," and a 'symposium' in which Dr. Moore and Prof. Stout took part on the "Status of Sense-Data". (What by the by is the distinction between a discussion and a symposium in this connexion? Is it that in the former the participants are rude to each other and that in the latter they are polite to each other? There is some evidence for this view in the volume before us.)

The symposium, Prof. Dawes Hicks' paper on "Appearance and Real Existence," and the translation of Lossky's article on "Intuitionism" have a pretty close connexion in their subject matter. Prof. Hicks begins with an historical discussion as to the meanings which appearance has had in important philosophical systems. He is concerned to show for his own part that appearances are 'not objects but ways in which objects are presented'. He says that we are immediately aware not of sense-data but of things, and the grounds that he offers are (a) that we need attention and abstraction to know that we are aware of sense-data and (b) that our immediate objects are complexes and not separate sense-data. The latter argument seems to me quite irrelevant; the former rests on the view that if we are immediately aware of anything we must also be immediately aware that we are aware of it. And this seems very doubtful. Either our attention creates the sense-data of which Prof. Hicks admits that we find ourselves to be aware or not. If not the sense-data are objects all along whether we know it or not. In such examples as the stick in water I fail to see how we are helped by the explanation: The stick has a bent appearance = the bent appearance is a way in which a straight stick surrounded by water is presented to us. For I do not see that this is (a) incompatible with the bent appearance being an object to us, nor (b) what precisely is meant by 'way' here. If 'way' = 'means' then the only means by which the appearance presents the stick is by being an object and being believed to be connected in some definite way with the stick. And if 'way' = a particular kind of mental act whose object is the straight stick or some part or quality of it *what* precisely is bent? Surely not a mental act.

Lossky's article is very similar to the one which he contributed to the volume on Logic in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. It begins by a sound and sensible recognition of all the distinctions by confusing which most idealisms render themselves plausible. But it seems to me to fail to recognise the many difficulties which confront naive realism even after these confusions are removed. One remarkable statement is that very likely secondary qualities are qualities of parts of our nervous systems. I find it difficult to believe that when I see a green patch of colour some part of my nervous system must be green, and

obviously the whole suggestion needs a great deal more elaboration before it begins to be plausible. According to Lossky all propositions are in themselves necessary, and the relation between subject and predicate is that of ground and consequent. What we call a necessary proposition is one in which the predicate is seen to follow necessarily from some quality already recognised to be present in the subject; in what we call contingent propositions the predicate is equally necessitated by something in the subject, but that something has not been explicitly recognised by us. It is obvious that such a view can only be maintained if we take causal laws to be laws of necessary connexion, hold that all qualities are connected by such laws with each other, and are further prepared to admit that what we take as one subject may have to be supplemented by something which we took to be other subjects. For Lossky all genuine judgements must be true; error arises through the subjective play of fancy adding to what is before the mind. But this subjective play will not lead to error unless we erroneously suppose it to be absent or that a part of the object really supplied by us is independent of us; and this seems to involve genuine false judgements.

The symposium is a very valuable piece of work. Dr. Moore elaborates with his usual clearness the relations which he believes sense-data to have to the mind, and states the difficulties in supposing that they either are physical objects or parts of them, and of validly inferring the existence and qualities of physical objects from them. Prof. Stout scouts the suggestion that our sense-data could exist when we are unaware of them, but holds that they are never given without a reference to a physical source in general. The progress of knowledge of the physical world consists in tying down this reference more and more, and seeing to what part of the total physical world (e.g. physical source, medium, or our own nervous system) a particular sense-datum is to be referred. I still find an epistemological difficulty in his position. Sense-data and their mutual relations are given in complexes related by these relations, and the relations and both the terms are present as particulars to the mind and can be analysed out of the complexes. But on his view of reference we are given a particular sense-datum and a relation with one end in it and the other in the universal 'some physical object or other'. Such a complex seems hardly capable of being given as a whole, and, if it be, it is difficult to see how we are to have any logical guarantee of our further determination of the universal 'some physical object,' in view of the fact that we never directly experience any particular physical object whatever. One minor point that remains is that it is difficult to see how Prof. Stout can be so sure at the same time of the two propositions (a) the sense-data of which I am aware never exist when I am unaware of them and (b) physical objects (of which I am never directly aware) are composed of more of the same kind as my sense-data.

There is an interesting article by Prof. Alexander on "Freedom". This he defines as enjoyed determination. E.g. we say that we are free when we feel a state of mind as determining another or as determining a contemplated physical event, such as a bodily change. And we say that we are unfree when a contemplated physical event is seen to determine a state of mind (and also apparently when a state of mind, however actually determined, is not felt as determined by some enjoyed state). Freedom increases as the determinant is more nearly identical with the whole felt self; but such determination is not of the essence of freedom. There are some very excellent remarks on the relation of causation to prediction; they seem to me to come to the true and important statement that although we may be able to predict what will be the parts and their relation in a certain complex it does not follow that we shall be able

to predict all or indeed its most interesting qualities. Prof. Alexander aptly quotes Dr. Moore's principle of organic unities in *Ethics* here. There are also some very difficult dicta about the memory of a past state of mind. Even with the help of a supplementary note I cannot profess to be clear enough as to Prof. Alexander's meaning either to summarise or to criticise them.¹

Mr. C. Delisle Burns contributes a very valuable paper on Ockham's Theory of Universals and argues that Ockham's controversy with the Scotists shows that we can dispense neither with universals nor with particulars.

I have no space left to do more than mention the remaining articles. These are "On Feeling" by Prof. Smith; on "Philosophy as the Co-ordination of Science" by Mr. H. S. Shelton; on the "New Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences" by Prof. Brough; on the "Psychology of Dissociated Personality" by Dr. W. L. McKenzie; on the "Notion of a Common Good" by Miss Shields; on "The Treatment of History by Philosophers" by Mr. Morrison; and on the "Principle of Relativity" by Dr. Wilson Carr, who holds that it all brings grist to Bergson's mill.

C. D. BROAD.

Introduction to the Science of Ethics. By THEODORE DE LAGUNA. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1914. Pp. xi, 414.

Prof. De Laguna has followed a method of his own in arranging the contents of his text-book. In Part I. he discusses briefly the character, methods and range of a science of Ethics and (more fully) the problem of moral freedom as necessarily introductory to further detailed study of Ethical problems. The remainder of the First Part is then devoted to an account of the standards by which conduct has actually been judged by civilised and uncivilised men, and the whole of Part II. to an historical account of the Ethical doctrines of the chief classical and modern thinkers. His own views are then expounded systematically in the third and last Part.

The author's style is fresh and agreeable; he illustrates his positions happily from cases known to have arisen in actual fact, and there is much to be said for his method of treating debated issues in dialectical fashion. This return to something like the dialogue as against the sophistical epideixis, in which the weak points of one side are almost certain to be concealed, seems to me likely to be of real value to the student. I should call the first two parts of the book on the whole both useful and entertaining and I believe they might be prescribed with advantage to a class of students first entering on the study of Ethics. But I should not like to go bail for all Mr. De Laguna's assertions about fact. It is a hazardous thing to talk of "*Socrates* and Francis Bacon" as typical empiricists, or to credit Plato with a "boundless contempt for the mass of mankind,"—a judgment probably inspired by popular misconceptions about the politics of Plato's family. And it is more than hazardous, it is appallingly false to say that Plato tells the philosopher to put himself "in a sphere where courage, temperance, and even justice have no place". One wonders if Mr. De Laguna looked up the description of the philosophic character in *Republic* II., before writing this amazing sentence. It is significant that in the whole account of

¹ Since writing this I have had some conversation with Prof. Alexander on this subject. I think that I now understand his view better; but I am not certain, for the better I seem to understand it the less plausible it seems to become. But I cannot do justice to him here.